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Understanding Populism Through Difference: The Significance of 
Economic and Social Axes.  
An Interview with Kenneth Roberts, Cornell University 
Interviewers: Kayla Bohannon and Alina Hechler, University of Kentucky 
 
Kenneth M. Roberts is the Richard J. Schwartz Professor of Government and Binenkorb Director of 
Latin American Studies at Cornell University.  His research and teaching interests focus on party 
systems, populism, social movements, and the politics of inequality in Latin America and beyond.  
He is the author of Changing Course in Latin America: Party Systems in the Neoliberal Era 
(Cambridge University Press) and Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social 
Movements in Chile and Peru (Stanford University Press).  He is also the co-editor of The 
Resurgence of the Latin American Left (Johns Hopkins University Press), The Diffusion of 
Social Movements (Cambridge University Press), and Beyond Neoliberalism? Patterns, 
Responses, and New Directions in Latin America and the Caribbean (Palgrave-MacMillan).   
 
So how did you first become interested in studying populism? 
Ken Roberts (KR): (laughs) I did not set out to do that when I was in graduate school. It came 
shortly after I finished my dissertation research and had begun as an assistant professor. I was 
having lunch with a colleague, Kurt Weyland, from the university of Texas. We were in Chile at 
a little cafe talking about recent fieldwork that we had been doing. I had been in Peru, under 
Fujimori, and he had been in Brazil. We were both talking about the rise of these new political 
eaders on the right side of the spectrum that were implementing free market or neoliberal 
reforms, but they were very much anti-establishment kinds of figures who ran against traditional 
political parties and against the political establishment, and made explicit appeals to the people 
for their support, and tried to articulate a closeness to the common people. So Kurt and I were 
talking about this, and we were kind of struck by some of the similarities in their political appeals 
to traditional kinds of populist leaders in Latin America, but they were doing so in a context 
where they supported different kinds of economic policies. And so Kurt ended up organizing an 
APSA panel, the American Political Science Association, on new forms of populism in Latin 
America. He and I ended up writing and publishing some things that talked about the rise of new 
kinds of populist political leadership that were embedded in a different historical era in Latin 
America and adopted different kinds of economic policies, and yet it was a certain political logic 
that they shared in terms of challenging traditional elites and appealing to the people. So that was  
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for me the starting point. My core research at that time, I was working mostly on the 
reincorporation of the parties on the left into the new democratic arena in Chile. This was the  
early 1990s after the democratic  transition in Chile. So, I was not really working on populism per 
se, but I was doing some comparative work with Peru, and I was quite struck by the Fujimori 
phenomenon. It was in response to that and to this dialogue that I had with a colleague around 
the anomalies of this new kind of populist political leadership that we thought we were seeing 
within the region. 
 
We have seen a strong global surge in support for right-wing populist parties and actors. What do you 
attribute this to? Why now, and not ten years ago? 
KR: Certainly, some of the antecedents for this rise were underway ten years ago. You could see 
it, obviously some of these movements had a presence and were slowly gaining some strength. 
Why you see it now, I would argue it is probably a confluence of different events that are factoring 
in. It is long term, erosion of the ability of the traditional parties to align and represent different 
sectors of society. In some ways I think it is reflecting the detachment of traditional political 
parties from the grassroots. I think part of it is also a response to the progressive convergence of 
traditional political parties around a common set of economic issues. And in some ways it is a 
response to the larger rubric of European integration around common sets of policies on a fairly 
wide range of issues. And I think what that tends to do is open the doors to some sort of populist 
challengers who politicize issues that the mainstream political parties are neglecting. So, I think 
for the parties, the far right ethnonationalist kinds of populist parties, they’re clearly 
responding to the challenges of immigration and the social, political, and economic integration 
of immigrant communities, in particular the 2015 crisis. In some ways I think that surge in 2015 
drew public attention to the issues in ways that allowed those political parties to try to make 
strong appeals on the basis of anti-immigrant kinds of platforms. But at the same time, you also 
see in southern Europe for example, the rise of what many people would argue are new platforms 
on the left flank, politicizing not the cultural issues of immigration, but more economic discontent 
coming out of the 2009 financial crisis. In particular, in southern European countries, the main 
debtor countries that were having to go through very difficult austerity and adjustment policies, 
where you saw traditional socialist parties implementing what are essentially very neoliberal 
kinds of economic adjustment platforms. So in that way, similar to what we saw in Latin America, 
in the earlier decades, where in the aftermath of neoliberal reforms, where all the mainstream 
political parties converged around some version of neoliberal orthodoxy, you saw the rise of new 
left populisms challenging that. So, I think that sort of depending on what part of Europe or part 
of the world you’re looking at, you see different kinds of populist challenges emerging. But in all 
cases, they tend to be politicizing issue dimensions or issue positions that mainstream political 
parties have not been giving much attention to, or that mainstream political parties really don’t 
effectively differentiate themselves on. 
 
Do you also see a connection there because the refugee crisis in Europe has also been effective in mobilizing 
right wing movements in the United States even though the US was not as impacted by that? Would you 
say something about the transnational character of populist sentiments? 
KR: Yes, I think there is certainly a transnational dimension to this. I think there was an element 
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of that in terms of left-wing populism as well in Latin America and even southern Europe where 
you saw some of the new left alternatives in Spain and in Greece that looked quite explicitly to 
the so-called Bolivarian cases in Latin America: Bolivia, Venezuela, Ecuador. So, some sort of 
political learning or transnational influence is there. And I think there is some version of that on 
the right too. In this day and age, it’s easy to stay in touch with what’s happening in other parts 
of the world, and there’s sort of a demonstration effect. To the extent that you see one populist 
figure using certain kinds of discontents or prejudices and politicizing those, then that tends to 
spill over into other places. And so Bolsonaro in Brazil was clearly picking up on some of the 
politics and the same kind of resentments and prejudices that Donald Trump was picking up on 
in the United States. I think you see Salvini or other figures in Europe in some ways playing off 
of the same script. Even though different countries are obviously different and these movements 
and political parties and leaders come from rather different places, there’s a certain script that 
they’re able to play out according to the particularities of their own national situation, and I think 
some of them are doing that fairly effectively. 
 
We have spent a good deal of time this semester discussing a distinction between left- wing populism in 
Latin America, versus right-wing populism in Europe and the United States. Do you think there is a 
significant distinction between these two types of populism? Are we even talking about the same thing 
when we refer to those two types of movements? 
KR: Yeah, this is a very good question. I think it depends on what level of analysis you are talking 
about, whether there is some rationale for using the same label to refer to them. I think myself 
that if you’re thinking of populism as I do, as a political logic that structures political spaces, a 
binary divide between some sort of virtuous people, however you define the people, and then 
some sort of nefarious or corrupt elite, however you construct the elite...if populism is understood 
as a basic political division between the elite and the people, so that populism is evoking some 
sort of appeal to popular sovereignty, I think you can identify forms of populism on the left and 
the right. At that level of analysis, there is something they share. They are both making some sort 
of common appeal to the people against an elite. But of course, the devil’s always going to be in 
the details, and ultimately these are radically different kinds of movements or radically different 
kinds of populisms. There is much more that differentiates them, I would argue, than what they 
share. So, I think we have to be cautious in using the populist label. In fact, I would argue that 
the populist label is way too overused. In particular I’m cautious of using it without the adjectives 
that would define what kind of populism that we’re talking about. So, I am uncomfortable simply 
talking about populist parties in Europe because in Europe you do find populisms of the left and 
the right. I would always attach whatever other identifying labels, the far right or the ethno-
nationalist populists, or the left populisms in southern Europe. I think those adjectives tell you 
much more about the nature of those movements and what their impact is likely to be on the 
society where they emerge as opposed to simply referring to them as populism. At the end of the 
day I think what they share as populist is fairly thin and probably fairly insubstantial. What is, I 
think, more important is where they differ. 
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Americans who are fed up with politics as usual have recently flocked to populist political candidates. They 
see the rupture of the political establishment as a good thing. What would you say to someone who thinks 
that populist government would make life better in the United States? 
KR: (laughs) Yeah, it is a tough question because clearly a lot of people are unhappy with the 
status quo. I think that both of our traditional parties have limitations in terms of really being able 
to effectively incorporate and respond to the full range of interests that exist within American 
society. So, it’s very understandable that people are interested in new alternatives. It’s important 
to know when we talk about the kinds of figures that many people would label as populist in the 
US, which is Trump on the right or Bernie Sanders on the left, it’s striking that both of them in 
contrast to what you usually see in Europe or Latin America, they both emerge within traditional 
mainstream parties. Trump is not a traditional Republican by any stretch of the imagination, but 
he uses the Republican party as his vehicle to gain access to electoral office. Bernie Sanders is also 
not a traditional Democrat, but he also ran using the primaries. The primary system in the US 
opens the door for candidates who are not traditional members of the political party or members 
of the party leadership to appeal directly to the people for support, in essence to try to use the 
primaries then as an institutional opportunity to run as a populist figure against the political 
establishment. So, in some ways American political institutions are uniquely designed to create 
opportunities for this-- not just the primaries but I think other aspects of our institutions. I would 
argue that simply running against the establishment does not get you very far. I think there are 
very legitimate reasons to run against the status quo and the establishment in the United States, 
but on what basis are you doing so? When you look at the rationale for Bernie Sanders’s critique 
of the establishment, it is radically different in most ways than Donald Trump’s. Sanders is in 
particular going after the influence of private wealth on the democratic process in the US, and the 
extent to which the political establishment is dependent upon the sources of funding that come 
from private interests and the ways in which that distorts democratic representation. I happen to 
share a lot of those criticisms. I think that the fact that a populist candidate may be bringing those 
kind of issues to the table may be an important way of expanding the range of democratic debate 
in the United States, thinking about, are there things we can do to try to reform and improve our 
democratic institutions? It is easy to look around the world and identify places where populism 
creates real challenges to democracy. But I think we also must recognize that populism does bring 
in new voices, new interests, sometimes new issue positions into a democratic area in ways that 
can expand democracy and potentially reform democracy. I think that is what makes populism 
especially difficult for us because it can be a two-edged sword. Populism almost always means 
bringing in new people or giving new voices some sort of representation in the political arena. 
The question, is, can you do that in ways that amplify and perfect democracy as opposed to doing 
it in ways which end up whittling away traditional kinds of democratic levers. And that is the 
problem that we see in places like Hungary, Venezuela, where you see populist figures coming 
to power and concentrating power in ways that undermine the checks and balances of liberal 
democratic rule. I think that the challenge for democracy is, can you find ways to amplify 
democracy in positive ways without undermining those democratic checks and balances? This is 
not just a populism problem. This is an age-old challenge that democracy faces. 
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Trump’s Make America Great Again slogan successfully serves as an empty signifier onto which different 
groups project meaning. But he has also faced opposition within his own party. Why do you think other 
Republican candidates were unable to compete with Trump and his message during the 2016 primaries? 
KR: I think this is something that caught a lot of us by surprise, even those of us who take 
populism seriously and recognize that there are strong populist currents in American society. I 
think that many of us underestimated the extent to which the Republican party really has 
transformed itself in recent decades. And in some ways the party has been cultivating those kinds 
of populist currents for quite some time. But you had a party establishment that was always able 
to maintain control of the party at the top level and make sure that one of their candidates was 
the nominee for the presidency. And we saw that in 2012, where there were a series of grassroots 
populist type figures who channeled these currents within the party and challenged Mitt Romney 
in the presidential campaign in the primary season, but at the end of the day it was Romney who 
prevailed and those populist candidates fizzled out. What was different in 2016 was that Trump 
never fizzled out. He made it very clear that at the grassroots of the Republican party, this is the 
party. It has become an anti-establishment party that has deep populist tendencies, and he is the 
figure that pulls those different strands together. I would argue now that it is his party, and it is 
very much a populist political party, and it is less of mainstream conservative party than the 
Republican party was traditionally. So, you still have mainstream elements within the party, 
there’s still a party elite that remembers the old way of doing things, but the party has become 
very ideological, and it is also become very populist, and those things do not necessarily go 
together. But I think Trump has effectively knit together those strands within the party, so at this 
point it really is very much his political party. And in the absence of some sort of crisis within his 
administration, I see very little opportunity for any mainstream challenge to Trump from within 
the Republican party. 
 
And so you have business millionaires more in touch with the Republican base than mainstream politicians 
who have been doing this for years and who actually come from these districts and not from Manhattan. 
KR: Yeah, this is one of the classic contradictions of the Trump era. Populism almost always is 
riven with contradictions, and this is a classic one. How is it that a billionaire can take up the 
populist mantle as the representative of the common person, of we the people? But Trump is not 
a conventional billionaire. Obviously, he’s wealthy, but he was never fully integrated into the 
most elite Wall Street financial sectors of American capitalism. He represented a different branch 
of American capitalism. So even though he became quite wealthy, he was never really fully 
accepted within those elite networks. And in some ways, he sort of represented this place where 
wealthy capitalism intersected with pop culture, with the celebrity culture. He is in the 
professional wrestling hall of fame, not as a wrestler but as a businessman. It was casinos, it was 
the beauty pageants, it was professional wrestling. He was not a titan of Wall Street. So, in some 
ways he connected to a sphere of Americana as sort of a business celebrity more than a business 
tycoon himself. And in many ways as he remade his business empire, he did so as a celebrity 
more than as a businessman. But at the end of the day, whatever his wealth may be, he is an 
individual of rather common tastes. This is something in Pierre Ostiguy’s work on populism 
where he talks about the flaunting of the low, the ability to talk gruffly. For Trump, the kind of 
food he eats, his way of talking, his mannerisms, are not those of a titan of Wall Street. He has 
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sort of everyday man kinds of appeals. And there is a place in some ways that I think that helps 
to authenticate who he is to people at the grassroots. He’s sort of like them, just more successful. 
He is like them, but he has more money. And in the study of populist leadership there’s work 
that talks about this. Yeah, you must be like the everyday person, but the reality is the average 
worker doesn’t want someone just like them, just a worker in the White House. They want 
somebody who is more like them, but only somehow better or more successful or knows how to 
get things done. And in a sense, I think when Trump talks, they hear somebody who thinks and 
talks the way they do, and yet somebody who’s a billionaire and who they see as a very successful 
business person. I would also like to point out, to come back to this notion of the flaunting of the 
low, which Ostiguy defines in sociocultural terms. It’s sort of the ways in which Trump is 
deliberately politically incorrect, something that the establishment, the elite is directly offended 
by. Oftentimes populist figures like to make fun of the elites, they like to affront elites. And a 
leader who speaks in those terms, the kinds of things that many of us would be offended by, they 
tend to appeal to a lot of people who are angry with things, who feel that they have  been 
neglected, or worse, that they have been exploited somehow or been abused by those who are in 
power. And so, someone who they see as speaking the truth to power, they like that combative 
streak. And some of the opinion polls suggest that more than Trump’s policies-- and who knows, 
the policies are all over the map, there is nothing coherent or consistent about the policies-- 
what is consistent in Trump is this combativeness, and this willingness to be politically incorrect, 
and to not adhere to the basic norms and rules of the game. And that appeals to those slices, those 
sectors of society who feel left behind and resent their lack of power. And so again, this is one of 
the ways in which a billionaire can frame himself as someone who can really represent those 
groups in society. 
 
The 2018 midterm elections brought in Democratic freshmen legislators, some of whom have been pushing 
for legislation and positions that are left of the mainstream Democratic party. Do you see some similarities 
here to the change of the Republican party into a movement-based party going on? 
KR: I think there is an element of that and I think a lot of that is a very positive energy at the 
grassroots within the party. I think that there were a lot of things about the Democratic Party as 
a party establishment, or a party machine, that I personally would find objectionable. I think that 
there is a new, sort of renovation process that is underway at the grassroots. It is bringing a lot of 
new energy and new ideas into the Democratic Party in ways that are very very positive, and in 
some ways they are remaking the party into less of a party machine and more of a grassroots- 
based movement, which might be a very good thing for the party and for American democracy. 
It is important to keep in mind, though, that it does in some ways feed what people call 
the polarization in American politics, which in many respects, I think, has been a 
misinterpretation of what we have seen. I think we must be careful in how we use that term, 
because when you look at it from the two political parties, the polarization has been highly 
asymmetric. Until recent times in the United States, and by that, I mean to the extent that there is 
been polarization American politics, it's largely been the Republican party moving in a more 
ideological direction. We forget that the Democratic party clearly tried to not only move to the 
center, but in many ways was supporting very pro-market kinds of policies on trade and on 
financial deregulation. This was hardly a party of the radical left, and I think very few people 
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would even recognize the Democratic party as a party of the left - certainly not in any comparative 
perspective. The Democratic party could not be compared to parties of the left in European 
democracies. In a comparative context, the Democratic party would not be considered to be a 
party of the left. Now, with the rise of Bernie Sanders - arguably the Occupy Wall Street 
movement in some ways fed some  movement currents, which I think filter their way into the 
Bernie Sanders campaign of 2016 and which you see increasingly active at the grassroots within 
the party. You see movements becoming infused into the Democratic party, which have never 
been absent. We forget that the civil rights movement had a strong presence historically, [just as] 
the women's movement, the anti-war movements. There has always been at least some movement 
dynamic within the grassroots of the Democratic party, but I think there are new elements of that 
today. And I think they are pulling the party more to the left on a range of public policy issues, 
both economic and cultural. 
Now there was a version of that story, of course, that played out in the Republican party 
in recent decades as well. The Tea Party movement, certainly, pulled the party to the right, but 
you also had an infusion into the Republican party from the Christian evangelical movement, the 
anti-abortion sectors, the gun rights movements, and now, in contemporary times, anti-
immigrant types of movements. So there has been some mobilization at the grassroots that has 
pulled the Republican party further to the right. And until fairly recent times, I think, the story of 
polarization was largely a story about the conservative party. I think we are in a situation today, 
where you can see both parties moving towards their respective poles and taking more 
ideologically differentiated positions on the issues. That has certainly opened the democratic 
arena to a wider range of debates, which can be quite healthy and can be rejuvenating, but it also 
tends to intensify the conflicts. I think it creates a lot of uncertainty over how the institutions will 
manage this, because we're accustomed to the institutions being set up to function in a context 
where the two parties overlap in the middle and where both parties sort of compete in the center 
for what we call the median voter. And in a context where the two parties are moving towards 
their respective poles, the ways in which institutions like the Supreme Court, Congressional 
investigative commissions, or other kinds of institutions of American democracy work, becomes 
quite different. And so, I think that is some of the uncertainty that we see in contemporary 
American politics. 
 
That partly answers the next question, which was, if Trump’s brand of right-wing populism should be met 
with a new brand of left-wing populism. 
KR: I myself would probably not want to call it left-wing populism. But I do think that Trump's 
brand of populism should be met by a lot of energy at the grassroots from those sectors of 
American society that are troubled in terms of what Trump's presidency means for women's 
rights, for immigrants, for healthcare policies, for gun control, for a wide range of issues. Where 
we do see mobilization taking place is at the grassroots within the Democratic party, some of it 
to the left of the Democratic party. I think that mobilization at the grassroots creates some 
opportunities to bring new energy into the democratic arena in ways that can safeguard the 
institutions from some of the potential threats that could exist from forms of right-wing populism, 
and potentially even push the democratic process to make it more inclusive and more open to the 
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full range of interests that we see in American society. So, I see this energy at the grassroots as a 
positive development. I am reluctant to call it left-wing populism. I think there are new 
movements, and the challenge for them is to find ways to come together and to cohere into some 
sort of political platform that creates a real alternative in American democracy. 
 
In your article “Parties, Populism, and Democratic Decay” you said that the two US political parties are 
differentiated more along the lines of social issues rather than economic issues. Do you think that populism 
is generally more concerned with one type of issue than others? Is differentiation regarding social issues 
more likely to mobilize populism than differentiation rather than differentiation based on economic issues? 
KR: I think that with the rise of Bernie Sanders within the Democratic party you can now see the 
new politicization of economic issues in ways that we have not seen for quite some time. The 
Clinton presidency and its supporters in the Democratic party were not a branch of the party that 
was especially close to blue-collar workers. Theirs was a branch of the party that very strongly 
supported free trade, a branch of the party that basically implemented financial deregulation 
policies. So those are all pro-market policies that left aside a lot of American citizens. And so I 
think what you see now is the politicization in particular of economic inequalities under Bernie 
Sanders and questions of the levels of taxation: what kinds of Health Care, what kinds of rights 
do we have as democratic citizens to healthcare? These are the type of issues that Bernie Sanders 
and others from the left wing of the Democratic party have put on the agenda now, and that has 
expanded the Democratic agenda dramatically from what it was in the era of Clinton, and even 
the Obama era. 
I think we see a very different debate underway over the range of policies on the economic 
axis. I think we are seeing a re-politicization of that economic axis on which the differences 
between the parties never collapsed in the U.S. The Republican party is so ideological on the other 
flank compared to Europe, but I think that the traditional understanding of polarization misses 
the fact that the Democratic party was not on the left pole, that it was very much in the center and 
even the center right on the economic axis, but that has changed considerably. 
There has been polarization between the parties on the social or cultural axis that goes 
further back. This is basically an axis, I would argue, between some sort of cosmopolitan/ 
multicultural/ universalist understanding of who we are as a country, and something that is more 
nationalistic, more ethno-nationalistic, and tends to have strong religious identities as well on the 
other pole. And that pole has really been heavily politicized in many respects going back to the 
civil rights movement, and then the countermovement on the right against the civil rights 
movement. This process of party polarization really begins in the 60s, when the civil rights 
movement leads the southern conservatives to break with the Democrats and move into the 
Republican party. Right before then, the two parties overlapped in the center. We forget that the 
Republican party was more liberal on civil rights issues than the Democratic party until the 1960s. 
So this is a fairly recent phenomenon, but what's happened in the civil rights movement in this 
sense, and then the counter-movements that followed and the other movements that came in its 
wake - the anti- war movement, the women's movement, the gay rights movement - those 
movements all politicized the social-cultural axis in ways which have pulled the parties further 
apart over time. I would argue that is the axis where we have consistently seen true polarization 
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between the parties in American politics. 
I think the economic polarization on that other axis is quite recent. Therefore, it's very 
problematic, I think, to talk simply about the left and the right in the United States. These are 
separate axes, if you plot them out spatially, they are orthogonal to each other. There is nothing 
about being an evangelical Christian, for example, that requires you to be a market 
fundamentalist on the economic access. These are separate axes, and what the Republicans have 
effectively done is pull these axes together and convince people that there is such a thing as a 
“conservative movement” that is defined in terms of market orthodoxy, Judeo-Christian 
identities, and gun rights and other kinds of things - but that's a product of effective packaging. 
It is a bundling of issue positions that really occupied different competitive axes and there are 
ways in which they can be broken up. You see that in part with Trump, because Trump is 
supporting a trade war - nothing could be more antithetical to a market orthodox position than 
trade wars. And what Trump's populism has done, is pull together strands that allow him to 
appeal to certain constituencies that he could not appeal to if he adhered to the ideological 
orthodoxy of the Republican party on the economic axis. Trump himself is sort of redrawing these 
alignments in American politics, as populism often does, because populism is rarely, if ever, 
ideologically orthodox. 
 
Talking about the two-party system in the US. In western European countries, populist parties have been 
maybe able to enter coalitions, but they have not been able to gain control of the national government. 
Would you say that a two-party system is inherently more susceptible to a populist takeover than a multi-
party system? 
KR: I think this is one of the places where the American institutions set us up for this unexpected 
turn, and in the absence of primaries you would not get this. In a parliamentary system, for 
example, it is the legislative block of the party that selects who is the Prime Minister. That 
obviously would not be Donald Trump in the Republican party - you would not have had Trump 
emerge in a parliamentary system. Proportional representation makes it easier for new parties to 
form, so far-right elements tend to form on the right flank of the mainstream political parties. 
What you see in Europe is that they start as very small marginal parties on the right flank. Now 
they have been growing over time, but they have not been able to access power directly in 
Western Europe. They have worked their way into coalition governments in a number of 
countries, but they have not directly taken the reins of power. 
In the U.S. case you have the combination of a presidential system with plurality elections 
rather than proportional representation, and then primaries which allow an independent outsider 
to come in and run as a Republican, even if they are not a traditional Republican. That 
combination of institutions, I think, has left us susceptible to this kind of populist takeover in 
ways that we did not really imagine. Without the primary system, Trump would have had to run 
as an independent. There are cases, like Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, where the traditional 
establishment breaks down and somebody can run as an outsider against that establishment and 
win elections. We have not seen that in the United States. Instead, the populist outsider works 
within one of the mainstream parties and basically has now taken control of one of the parties. 
So, it's a very different institutional dynamic the way in which it is played out here. We 
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see this kind of populist leadership and power in a number of Eastern European countries, post- 
communist Hungary in particular and Poland now, but we have not seen this populist leadership 
take control and become the head of states in the Western European context. Salvini is sort of the 
strongman in Italy, but he is only the minister of the Interior. He is not the Prime Minister, but he 
clearly has a strong influence. In Austria and other places, you see these parties in coalition 
governments, but nowhere do they directly control the reins of state power yet in Western 
Europe. 
 
And lastly, what are any future projects that you are currently pursuing? 
KR: I am hoping to do a little bit of work that is new for me, which would be to look at the 
Republican party in a comparative perspective. I think we do not have a good handle yet on how 
the party has been transformed over time by the infusion of these movement currents into the 
party and its transformation into a populist vehicle. 
I think a lot of the American politics literature doesn't give us a good handle for 
understanding that process of transformation, and I don't think we have a good understanding 
of how the Republican party is more ideologically orthodox - or ideologically radical if you want 
to call it that - than any of the other mainstream conservative parties that you see in Europe or 
elsewhere. But while it has this ideological orthodoxy, it also has this populist current that has 
now been grafted onto this ideological platform in ways that are very unusual. As a political 
scientist, I think the Republican party is a very unusual case that needs to be understood in 
comparative terms because that gives you a different vantage point on what's taking place than 
what you can do just by studying it from an American politics perspective. So that is what I am 
hoping to move towards. 
